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UTILITARIANISM AND
PRIORITARIANISM II
DAVID MCCARTHY
University of Edinburgh
The priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there
is a serious question about how it should be formalized. The most natural
formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding
expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post
prioritarianism entails a claim which is too implausible for it to be a serious
competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably
never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place. By contrast, ex
ante prioritarianism is defensible. But its motivation is very different from
the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex
post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view
to revert to utilitarianism.
Although the idea itself is quite old and has been familiar to economists
for several decades, Parfit’s 1991 Lindley Lectures (Parfit, 2000) led to the
priority view becoming very popular among moral philosophers. But
Parfit’s work and much of the subsequent philosophical work on the
priority view has been informal, and there is a serious question about
how the priority view should be formalized. I will therefore reserve the
term ‘the priority view’ for the cluster of informal and perhaps not fully
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2 DAVID MCCARTHY
determinate ideas found in Parfit’s work and subsequently adopted by
many others. And I will reserve ‘prioritarianism’ for various attempts to
formalize those ideas.
There are at least two theories which deserve to be seen as
formalizations of the priority view, what I call ex ante prioritarianism and
ex post prioritarianism. I discuss ex ante prioritarianism in a companion to
this article (McCarthy, 2006). There I use ex ante prioritarianism to defend
the priority view against the conclusion of Broome (1991) that the priority
view is meaningless. Here I focus on ex post prioritarianism.
Ex post prioritarianism is the most natural formalization of the priority
view. But building on an idea due to Rabinowicz (2001, 2002), I will show
that ex post prioritarianism entails a very surprising conclusion. And I will
argue that this conclusion is too implausible for ex post prioritarianism to
deserve its place as a serious competitor to utilitarianism.
If that is right, it may seem natural for friends of the priority view
to shift their allegiance to ex ante prioritarianism. But the ideas which
underlie ex ante prioritarianism are different enough from those which
underlie ex post prioritarianism that I think it would be more natural for
them to revert to utilitarianism. In fact, I doubt that ex post prioritarianism
was ever a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place.
To motivate ex post prioritarianism will require a lot of care, so an
informal sketch may help to frame the discussion. Ex post prioritarianism
rests on three key ideas.
The first idea is that so-called Pigou–Dalton transfers always make
histories better. A Pigou–Dalton transfer makes a better off person A
worse off by some amount, and a worse off person B better off by that
same amount, while still leaving A better off than B was to start with.
This is where ex post prioritarianism departs from utilitarianism, for
utilitarianism is indifferent to Pigou–Dalton transfers.
The second idea is that the contribution each person’s life makes
to overall goodness is independent of what other people’s lives are
like. This is where ex post prioritarianism departs from egalitarianism.
For according to egalitarianism, at least as usually understood, the
contribution someone’s life makes to overall goodness can depend on
how it affects the patterns of equality, and that can depend on what other
people’s lives are like.
These two ideas are only about when one entire world history is better
than another. To extend them to a complete theory, we need to take risk
into account. In other words, we need to be able to say when one lottery
over histories is better than another. The third idea is that the account of
when one lottery is better than another conforms to the axioms of expected
utility theory. This idea is often just taken for granted.
Taken separately, there seems to be a reasonable case for each of these
three ideas. But the main claim of this article is that although there is
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indeed a reasonable case for each of these ideas, their conjunction is
incoherent.
Section 1 presents restricted prioritarianism, a formalization of what
the priority view says about when one history is better than another.
Section 2 extends restricted prioritarianism to a view about lotteries
by adding expected utility theory, resulting in what I call weak ex
post prioritarianism. Section 3 rehearses the way the literature has seen
the defence of the claims which go into weak ex post prioritarianism.
Section 4 argues that friends of the priority view are committed to a further
claim, resulting in ex post prioritarianism. Section 5 derives an apparently
implausible conclusion from ex post prioritarianism. Section 6 argues
that because of this conclusion, we should reject ex post prioritarianism.
Section 7 argues that ex post prioritarianism was never a genuine
alternative to utilitarianism anyway. Section 8 reassesses the priority view
in the light of all this.
1. RESTRICTED PRIORITARIANISM
We are eventually going to be interested in the betterness relation. The
betterness relation holds between lotteries over histories. In particular, it
holds between lotteries L1 and L2 just in case L1 is at least as good as L2. But
most of the discussion of the priority view in the philosophical literature
starts by ignoring risk. It focuses on what I will call the restricted betterness
relation. The restricted betterness relation holds between histories. In
particular, it holds between histories h1 and h2 just in case h1 is at least
as good as h2.
This terminology has a natural explanation. Let us first identify any
history h with the corresponding degenerate lottery L= [1, h] in which h
has probability one. By restricting the betterness relation to degenerate
lotteries, we immediately see that the restricted betterness relation is
embedded in, or is a special case of, the betterness relation. More generally,
I will often use the term ‘restricted’ to describe a principle about histories
which can be regarded as a special case of a principle about lotteries over
histories in an obvious way.
The implicit assumption in most of the philosophical literature is that
the distinctive ideas of the priority view are all to do with histories. Thus
the assumption seems to be that we do not need to discuss lotteries to
understand, for example, where and why the priority view disagrees with
utilitarianism and egalitarianism. It is very common for discussions of
the priority view to follow Parfit (2000) in not discussing lotteries at all.
It is also common to regard the extension to lotteries as an independent
and fairly straightforward problem. I am eventually going to question
whether ignoring lotteries at the outset is a good idea. But my first goal is
to articulate what I take to be the most standard version of the priority view.
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So in the spirit of the philosophical literature, this section presents what I
will call restricted prioritarianism. Restricted prioritarianism is meant to
formalize what the priority view says about when one history is at least as
good as another.
Some writers try to define the priority view just by stating its main
ideas informally, much as Parfit (2000) does. But this leaves it unclear what
these ideas jointly entail, to what extent these ideas pick out a unique view,
or in what way they need to be supplemented to arrive at such a view.
Other writers try to define the priority view with a mathematical formula
which expresses a view about when one history is better than another,
much as Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) does. The view expressed entails the
main ideas behind the priority view, and a formula has the advantages of
precision. But it is left unclear what all the ethical ideas which lie behind
the view expressed by the formula are. And it is also left unclear whether
some of those ideas go beyond the ideas we naturally associate with the
priority view.
Representation theorems can help us with such problems, since they
can show how various ethical ideas entail a view about when one history
is better than another which is expressed by a single formula. This section
provides such a theorem, and uses it to motivate the definition of restricted
prioritarianism. But first I need to introduce the assumptions which go
into the theorem. These fall into five groups: measurement assumptions;
an assumption connecting betterness and betterness for individuals;
assumptions about the structure of betterness; the restricted Pigou–Dalton
principle; and an assumption about what is known as separability across
people.
Individual goodness measures. The usual way of expressing interpersonal
and intrapersonal comparisons is to say such things as: a history h1 is
better for an individual i than h2 is for j. When i and j are different
individuals, that expresses an interpersonal comparison. When they are
the same individual, it expresses an intrapersonal comparison. But it is
easier to group the individual and history into a pair, which we can regard
as a life. Thus the better life relation holds between lives (i, h1) and ( j, h2)
just in case (i, h1) is at least as good a life as ( j, h2). Although the better life
relation is officially defined between lives, it is sometimes easier to revert
to more familiar idioms like “h1 is at least as good for i as h2 is for j”, and
to quantify over the individuals and histories concerned. However, (i, h)
denotes a life only if i exists in h. Whenever the more familiar idiom is
used, quantification is therefore always understood as tacitly restricted, so
that the individual exists in the history in question.
A real valued function v is said to represent a binary relation R just in
case: for all x and y, Rxy if and only if v(x) ≥ v(y). This is a very important
concept, and will be used throughout the article. When we use a function
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to represent a relation, our real interest is almost always in the binary
relation. But it is often more convenient to work with a function which
represents the relation rather than work directly with the relation itself.
I will say that a function is a restricted individual goodness measure just
in case the function takes an individual and a history containing that
individual and gives a real number which somehow measures how good
the history is for the individual. Restricted individual goodness measures
therefore somehow measure how good lives are from the perspective of
the individuals leading them. This falls short of a full definition because I
have not said what it is to somehow measure how good a history is for an
individual. I am not going to get into that topic here because the theory of
measurement is complicated. But I will take it for granted that a necessary
condition for a function to be a restricted individual goodness measure is
that it represents the better life relation. Restricted prioritarianism makes a
further assumption which I will call the measurement assumption: it assumes
that there exists a restricted individual goodness measure, and that any
two restricted individual goodness measures are related by what is known
as a positive affine transformation. That is a transformation of the form x →
ax + b where a and b are real numbers and a> 0. So if g(i, h) and g˜(i, h) are
two restricted individual goodness measures, then g˜(i, h) = ag(i, h) + b for
some a> 0 and b. Although there is allowed to be more than one restricted
individual goodness measure, it is common to work with just one of them
as long as we are careful that whatever we use it to say does not depend
on the particular measure chosen.
The measurement assumption entails that the better life relation is
complete: for any individuals i and j and any histories h1 and h2, either
h1 is at least as good for i as h2 is for j, or h2 is at least as good for j as
h1 is for i. Because of doubts about whether it is always possible to make
evaluative comparisons of very different sorts of lives, some will find this
assumption implausible. But I will take it to be an idealizing assumption
which enables us to focus more sharply on other problems.
The final assumption about restricted individual goodness measures
can be ignored by anyone not greatly interested in technicalities. Very
roughly, it amounts to saying that some lives are better than others, that any
individual can lead any possible kind of life, and that all combinations of
possible kinds of lives are possible. More precisely, let g(i, h) be a restricted
individual goodness measure, and write it in the more familiar form gi(h).
For any population  let H be the set of all histories whose population
is . The rectangular field assumption is that there exists an interval I of
real numbers of positive length such that for any population  of size
n≥ 1, {[gi (h),. . .,gn (h)]:h ∈ H} = I”. Here and throughout I assume that
individuals can exist in more than one history. This assumption could be
avoided by using the counterpart theory of Lewis (1968), but I stick with
the more familiar idea.
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The rectangular field assumption is similar to the assumption of the
same name in Broome (1991) and McCarthy (2006). Broome outlines the
philosophical questions it raises. But like him, I am not going to be overly
troubled by it. It is another idealizing assumption. The role of all the
idealizing assumptions will be defended at the end of this section. The
effect of the rectangular field assumption is to give the restricted betterness
relation a relatively simple structure. This will enable us to understand it
better by using some powerful theorems.
Individual betterness and betterness. The following principle connects the
two, and is a special case of a principle due to Broome (1991).
Restricted principle of personal good For any two histories h1 and h2
containing the same population: if h1 and h2 are equally good for every
member of the population, then they are equally good; and if h1 is better
than h2 for at least one member of the population, and at least as good for
every member of the population, then h1 is better than h2.
The structure of betterness. The restricted betterness relation is transitive if
and only if for any histories h1, h2 and h3: if h1 is at least as good as h2, and
h2 is at least as good as h3, then h1 is at least as good as h3. And it is complete
if and only if for any histories h1 and h2: either h1 is at least as good as
h2, or h2 is at least as good as h1. A binary relation which is transitive and
complete is known as an ordering. Restricted prioritarianism assumes that
the restricted betterness relation is an ordering.
Restricted prioritarianism also assumes that the restricted betterness
relation is continuous. Like the rectangular field assumption, this
assumption is adopted to make it easier to use mathematics to understand
the restricted betterness relation. Very roughly, it says that small changes
in individual goodness only ever amount to small changes in overall
goodness. It is too mathematical to state properly here, but it is widely
adopted in welfare economics and almost any formal study of orderings
will provide a good explanation. See for example Wakker (1989). Since
I cannot explain it any further, I will treat it as another idealizing
assumption.
Finally, restricted prioritarianism assumes that the restricted betterness
relation is impartial. That means that it cares only which sorts of lives
are being led, not which individuals are leading them. For example, if a
good life and a bad life are being led, it is a matter of indifference who
is leading the good life and who is leading the bad life. More precisely,
suppose histories h1 and h2 contain populations 1 and 2 respectively,
and suppose that 1 and 2 are of the same size. Suppose further that
there is some mapping π from 1 onto 2 such that for all members i of
1: h1 is as good for i as h2 is for π (i). Then the restricted betterness relation
is impartial just in case in all such such cases, h1 is as good as h2.
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The only one of these assumptions about the structure of the restricted
betterness relation which most philosophers would not readily grant is
the completeness assumption. But like the assumption that the better life
relation is complete, it is a commonly made idealizing assumption which
enables us to focus on other problems more sharply. I am not going to dwell
on these assumptions because the focus of where the priority view is seen
as departing from its main competitors, utilitarianism and egalitarianism,
lies in the following conditions.
Pigou–Dalton. This is where restricted prioritarianism departs from
utilitarianism. Informally, say that a history h2 can be obtained from a
history h1 by aPigou–Dalton transfer of individual goodness just in case we can
obtain h2 from h1 by taking some positive amount of individual goodness
from some personA and giving exactly that amount of individual goodness
to some other person B while still leaving A better off than B was originally,
and without affecting anyone else.
Restricted Pigou–Dalton principle For any two histories h1 and h2
containing the same population: if h2 can be obtained from h1 by a Pigou–
Dalton transfer of individual goodness, then h2 is better than h1.
The restricted Pigou–Dalton principle is one of the central claims of the
priority view. It is a natural way of formalizing what Parfit (2000) sees as the
most important component of the priority view, namely that “benefiting
people matters more the worse off these people are” (p. 213). Utilitarianism
rejects the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle, for utilitarianism regards all
Pigou–Dalton transfers of individual goodness as leaving histories exactly
as good as they were to start with. But according to the priority view,
“we should not give equal weight to equal benefits, whoever receives
them. Benefits to the worse off should be given more weight” (Parfit
2000, p. 366). It seems natural to interpret Parfit’s remarks as entailing
the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle, but I will delay discussing why
friends of the priority view accept this principle until section 3. Note that I
have not said that Parfit’s remarks point to the only way of defending the
restricted Pigou–Dalton principle. For example, many egalitarians accept
the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle because they believe Pigou–Dalton
transfers make inequality less bad, but friends of the priority view reject
this argument.
The informal definition of a Pigou–Dalton transfer talks about amounts
of individual goodness. More precisely, it seems to presuppose that we can
properly talk about when two differences in levels of individual goodness
are equal. For example, it seems to presuppose that we can properly say
when the difference between A’s level of individual goodness in h1 and
A’s level in h2 equals the difference between B’s level in h2 and B’s level in
h1.
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However, if the measurement assumption is correct, this is
unproblematic. For let g(i, h) and g˜(i, h) be two restricted individual
goodness measures. The measurement assumption entails that these are
related by a positive affine transformation, so that g˜(i, h) = ag(i, h) + b for
some a> 0 and b. But then it is simple algebra to show that
g(A, h1) − g(A, h2) = g(B, h2) − g(B, h1) if and only if
g˜(A, h1) − g˜(A, h2) = g˜(B, h2) − g˜(B, h1)
Therefore, if the difference in individual goodness for A between h1 and
h2 equals the difference in individual goodness for B between h2 and
h1 according to one restricted individual goodness measure, it equals it
according to all restricted individual goodness measures. In other words,
if h2 can be obtained from h1 by a Pigou–Dalton transfer of individual
goodness according to one restricted individual goodness measure, h2 can
be obtained from h1 by a Pigou–Dalton transfer of individual goodness
according to every restricted individual goodness measure.
In short, the measurement assumption entails that the presuppositions
about talking about amounts of individual goodness that seem to be built
into the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle are correct. The measurement
assumption is far from obvious. But given some assumptions about
completeness, it turns out to be entailed by an idea which has received
a lot of defence in the literature and which I will discuss in section 5,
namely Bernoulli’s hypothesis. So I am going to take the measurement
assumption on trust.
Strong separability. I need to introduce some terminology. Suppose histories
h1 and h2 contain the same population, and suppose that there is some
subpopulation such that for each member i of that subpopulation, h1 is
exactly as good for i as h2. The restricted betterness relation is strongly
separable across people if and only if in any such case, we can ignore what
h1 and h2 are like for each member of the subpopulation when we ask
whether h1 is at least as good as h2.
More formally, suppose h1, h2, h3 and h4 contain the same population
. Suppose for some subset  of : (1) for every member i of : h1
is exactly as good for i as h2, and h3 is exactly as good for i as h4; and
(2) for every member j of  − : h1 is exactly as good for j as h3, and h2 is
exactly as good for j as h4. Then the restricted betterness relation is strongly
separable across people if in all such cases: h1 is at least as good as h2 if
and only if h3 is at least as good as h4.
Parfit (2000) said that according to the priority view, the restricted
betterness relation is “nonrelational” (p. 372). To illustrate this very loosely,
according to the priority view, the urgency of making someone better
off is unrelated to how well off other people are. By contrast, Parfit
said that according to egalitarianism, the restricted betterness relation
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is “relational”. For making someone better off can affect the patterns of
equality or inequality differently according to how well off other people
are.
However, Parfit’s discussion is informal, and there is more than one
way of trying to formalize what it means for the restricted betterness
relation to be nonrelational. The most natural attempt, and the one
that seems to fit best with most of Parfit’s discussion, is to say that
nonrelational just means strongly separable across people. This leads
to an understanding of the distinction between the priority view and
egalitarianism which is quite widely accepted: according to the priority
view, the restricted betterness relation is strongly separable across people;
according to egalitarianism, it is not.
In my view, that is not quite right. The claim it makes about
egalitarianism is too strong, for one can be an egalitarian while accepting
that the restricted betterness relation is strongly separable across people
(McCarthy ms). And the claim it makes about the priority view is too weak
to be the whole truth. It is obvious from Parfit’s discussion that friends of
the priority view are committed to the claim that the restricted betterness
relation is strongly separable across people. But I think that this does not
capture every aspect of nonrelationality. In my view, friends of the priority
view are committed to the claim that the restricted betterness relation
satisfies a stronger condition than merely being strongly separable across
people. I will say more about this in section 5. However, my present goal
is to formalize the way the priority view has been standardly understood.
So for the time being I am going to stick to ideas that are explicit in the
literature. And whether or not they are committed to more than this, friends
of the priority view are plainly committed to the claim that the restricted
betterness relation is strongly separable across people.
I need to make a qualification which can be ignored by anyone not
interested in technicalities. It turns out that the claim that the restricted
betterness relation is strongly separable across people is not quite strong
enough to do all the work that people ask of it in cases where the population
contains exactly two people. The usual way of coping with this problem is
to add something known as the hexagon condition to cover the population-
size-two case. I believe that anyone who thinks that the restricted betterness
relation is strongly separable across people should also accept the hexagon
condition in such cases. But I will not try to spell out this complicated
condition and I will only mention it in the theorems; for formal discussion,
see e.g. Wakker (1989).
The representation theorem uses the following concepts. A real valued
function f is increasing just in case for all x and y in its domain, if x> y
then f(x) > f(y). And f is strictly concave just in case for all distinct x and y in
its domain, f ( x+y2 ) >
1
2 ( f (x) + f (y)). For example, the function
√
x on the
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positive reals is both increasing (it gets larger as x gets larger) and strictly
concave (it gets flatter as x gets larger). Finally, given a population , say
that the restricted betterness relation for  holds between two histories h1
and h2 just in case the population of both h1 and h2 is  and h1 is at least
as good as h2.
THEOREM 1. Assume:
(1) There exists a restricted individual goodness measure, and any two restricted
individual goodness measures are related by a positive affine transformation.
(2) The rectangular field assumption.
(3) The restricted principle of personal good.
(4) The restricted betterness relation is an impartial continuous ordering.
(5) The restricted betterness relation is strongly separable across people (and
satisfies the hexagon condition in population-size-two cases).
(6) The restricted Pigou–Dalton principle.
Then for every restricted individual goodness measure g(i, h) and any n≥ 1,
there exists an increasing and strictly concave function wn such that
∑
i∈
wn(g(i, h)) represents the restricted betterness relation for any population 
of size n.
The proof is in the appendix. Call premises (1) and (2) the background
assumptions. For the rest of this article, I am going to assume that they
are correct. I will give references to various defences of (1) in section 5.
I continue to treat (2) as an idealizing assumption. With the background
assumptions in place, we may define restricted prioritarianism as follows.
Restricted prioritarianism Let g(i, h) be a restricted individual goodness
measure. Then for any n≥ 1 there exists an increasing and strictly concave
function wn such that
i∈wn(g(i, h))
represents the restricted betterness relation for any population  of size n.
Given the background assumptions, restricted prioritarianism is logically
equivalent to the conjunction of premises (3) to (6). Theorem 1 establishes
one direction of the equivalence, and the other is straightforward. I will
therefore take premises (3) to (6) to express the main ethical ideas behind
restricted prioritarianism. Utilitarianism has no quarrel with any of them
except that it rejects the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle. At least as
normally understood, egalitarianism has no quarrel with any of them
except that it rejects strong separability across people.
It may seem odd to define restricted prioritarianism in a way which
covers cases of population-size-one. But Parfit (2000) and Rabinowicz
(2001, 2002) make it clear that they believe that the priority view applies
to such cases. However, note that all restricted prioritarianism says about
population-size-one cases is that one history is at least as good as another
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just in case it is at least as good for the sole member of the population. That
follows immediately from the fact that the function wn in the definition of
restricted prioritarianism is increasing. So restricted prioritarianism agrees
with utilitarianism about population-size-one cases, and in those cases says
nothing more than the restricted principle of personal good. But we will
later see that population-size-one cases are more complicated when we
introduce risk.
I have mentioned various ways in which both the background
assumptions and premises (3) to (5) contain idealizing assumptions. Since
I am going to criticize one prominent strand of thinking about the priority
view by taking restricted prioritarianism to be its starting point, one might
wonder how reasonable it is to load it up with idealizing and perhaps not
very plausible assumptions.
My own view is that at least most of the idealizing assumptions are
either correct or can be dispensed with. But it would take at least a separate
article to argue for that. Instead I will rely on the fact that the idealizing
assumptions pick out a wide and important range of cases. If the priority
view leads to trouble in those cases, it is in trouble even if the mathematics
is too complicated to allow us to rigorously establish the criticism in
all possible cases. For example, the mathematics would be much more
complicated if we abandoned the assumption that the restricted betterness
relation is continuous. But it is very hard to believe that the viability of
the priority view depends upon the restricted betterness relation not being
continuous. As far as I am aware, nothing remotely like an appeal to
the denial of any of the idealizing assumptions appears in any of the
arguments that have been put forward for the priority view. So I will carry
on regarding the idealizing assumptions as a harmless way of focusing on
the core of the priority view.
2. RISK
Anyone sympathetic to restricted prioritarianism will want to take risk into
account and to extend restricted prioritarianism to an account of when one
lottery over histories is at least as good as another. In other words, they will
want to extend restricted prioritarianism from an account of the restricted
betterness relation to an account of the betterness relation. This section
discusses a natural and seemingly quite plausible way of doing that.
To the extent that the philosophical literature discusses how to extend
the priority view to deal with risk, the assumption that the betterness
relation satisfies the axioms of expected utility theory is by far the most
common approach. I will discuss how the literature sees the defence of
this approach in the next section. This section just discusses the formal
implications of adding the assumption that the betterness relation satisfies
the expected utility axioms to restricted prioritarianism. To keep the
mathematics simple, I will assume that all lotteries are so-called simple
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lotteries, or lotteries with finite support. These are lotteries in which only
finitely many histories can result, each with positive probability.
If the betterness relation satisfies the axioms of expected utility theory,
the main result of expected utility theory tells us that there exists a function
v(h) defined on histories such that the function
(1) W(L) =  j p jv(h j ) represents the betterness relation.
Here and wherever I define a function f on lotteries by writing f (L) =
ϕ(p j , h j ) for some expression ϕ, this is short for: for any lottery L of the
form L= [p1, h1; p2, h2; . . .; pm, hm], where the history hj has a positive
probability of pj and all the probabilities sum to one, f(L) =ϕ(pj, hj).
Notice that by treating histories as degenerate lotteries, it follows that
v(h) represents the restricted betterness relation.
Let  be a population of size n. Suppose that restricted prioritarianism
is true, and let g(i, h) be a restricted individual goodness measure. Then
there exists an increasing and strictly concave function wn such that
(2) i∈ wn (g(i, h)) represents the restricted betterness relation for .
But let v(h) be the restriction of v(h) to histories whose population is .
Then v(h) also represents the restricted betterness relation for . This
means that we can exploit a simple but important result: two functions h
and k both represent the same binary relation if and only if there exists an
increasing function f such that h(x) = f(k(x)). This result is well known and
its proof is easy. By (2) it follows that there exists an increasing function fn
such that
(3) v(h) = fn (i∈wn(g(i, h)))
Let W(L) be the restriction of W(L) to lotteries over histories whose
population is . By (1) and (3) it follows that W(L) =  j p j fn(i∈
wn(g(i, h j ))) represents the betterness relation for . This motivates the
following definition.
Weak ex post prioritarianism Let g(i, h) be a restricted individual goodness
measure. Then for any n≥ 1 there exists an increasing and strictly concave
function wn and an increasing function fn such that
W(L) =  j p j fn(i∈wn(g(i, h j )))
represents the betterness relation for any population  of size n.
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And we have established the following.
THEOREM 2. Assume (1) restricted prioritarianism is true; and (2) the
betterness relation satisfies the axioms of expected utility theory. Then weak ex
post prioritarianism is true.
The not very transparent term ‘ex post’ is well established in economics. It
is used to describe approaches to evaluating lotteries over histories which
aggregate across people first to reach some kind of on balance evaluation
of histories before taking the probabilities of those histories into account
by multiplying. In this case, the on balance evaluation of a history hj
containing a population  of size n is expressed by the fn(i∈wn(g(i, hj)))
part of the formula for W(L).
In summary, taking the background assumptions on trust, we saw in
the previous section the ideas that go into restricted prioritarianism. We get
to weak ex post prioritarianism just by adding the claim that the betterness
relation satisfies the axioms of expected utility theory.
It is fairly obvious from a quick study of the literature on the
priority view that the ideas which weak ex post prioritarianism rests
upon are a natural formalization of ideas which are explicit in that
literature. But weak ex post prioritarianism is not altogether satisfactory.
For example, it is unclear how to interpret the function fn in the weak ex
post prioritarian formula. And weak ex post prioritarianism is consistent
with a position which does not seem in the spirit of the priority view.
In Parfit’s terminology, friends of the priority view believe that it is
more urgent to benefit the worse off than the better off, and the choice
of a particular increasing and strictly concave wn in the formula for
weak ex post prioritarianism represents a view about how much more
urgent when the population is of size n. But nothing in the definition
of weak ex post prioritarianism prevents a weak ex post prioritarian
from saying, for example, that when the population contains exactly two
people, it is very urgent to benefit the worse off, but when the population
contains exactly three people, it is only mildly urgent to benefit the worse
off.
However, there is a natural idea, and one which I will argue that
friends of the priority view are committed to, which solves both of these
problems in a single stroke. I will call this idea the extended separability
principle. Adding the extended separability principle will get rid of the
function fn, so there is no difficulty about the interpretation of that function.
And will force the function wn, to be independent of population size.
But while all of the ideas which go into weak ex post prioritarianism
are explicit in the philosophical literature on the priority view, the
extended separability principle is not. So before introducing it, I will say
some more about why many philosophers have found the priority view
plausible.
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3. THE DEFENCE OF WEAK EX POST PRIORITARIANISM
As I see it, the standard rationale for the priority view starts off with the
view that there is something wrong with utilitarianism. We have often
been told that utilitarianism is insensitive to questions about distribution,
and following Rawls (1971), it seems to have been taken for granted that
this is a problem with utilitarianism. But where exactly does utilitarianism
go wrong? The usual answer was that it attaches no importance to equality.
However, following the influential work of Parfit (2000), many
philosophers became troubled by some of the features of egalitarianism.
For example, Parfit’s divided world scenarios involve two communities,
each unaware of the other’s existence. There is perfect equality within
each community, but the members of one community are better off than
the members of the other community. Egalitarianism seems committed to
the view that such inequality is bad. But this may seem implausible. To give
another example, Parfit also claimed that egalitarianism is committed to
the view that achieving equality by bringing everyone down to the level of
the worst off is in one way good, even though it is better for none and worse
for some. This is the so-called levelling down objection to egalitarianism.
But Parfit argued that the priority view avoids these alleged problems,
while still enabling us to depart from utilitarianism and in many cases say
much the same thing as egalitarianism.
Tungodden (2003) calls this a negative defence of the priority view. It
is by far the most commonly expressed rationale for the priority view in
the literature, but it is easy to feel that it sneaks the priority view in via the
back door. We start by thinking that utilitarianism is problematic because
it ignores equality, discover some apparent difficulties with a concern with
equality, and go straight on to adopt the priority view. But why shouldn’t
we instead conclude that utilitarianism is less problematic that we thought?
Indeed, Broome (1989) was already complaining that the priority view is
ad hoc.
However, it is possible to find a positive defence of the part of the
priority view expressed by Parfit’s remark that “benefiting people matters
more the worse off these people are” and formalized by the restricted
Pigou–Dalton principle. This defence goes back to Rawls (1971), and is the
only defence of this part of the priority view I have found in the literature.
Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) suggests that this part of the priority view is
. . . a reaction to the well-known Rawlsian objection to utilitarianism: the
trouble with the latter, says Rawls, is that it ‘does not take seriously the
distinction between persons’. A utilitarian assumes the perspective of an
impartial spectator who sympathetically identifies with all the persons
involved and thereby fuses them into one. Thereby, for a utilitarian,
interpersonal compensations become as unproblematic as the intrapersonal
compensations have always been according to rational choice theory: it may
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be rational for a person to sacrifice some of her objectives in order to realize
her other goals. (Rabinowicz 2001: 10, quoting Rawls 1971: 27.)
So while it is unproblematic for a single person to make tradeoffs within
her own life, so that she is indifferent to transferring a unit of individual
goodness from one part of her life to another, it is to ignore the separateness
of persons to extend this idea to tradeoffs between different people’s lives.
Thus it is to ignore the separateness of persons to hold, as utilitarianism
does, that it is always a matter of indifference to transfer a unit of individual
goodness from one person to another. Extending this idea, it is to respect
the separateness of persons to hold that a transfer of a unit of individual
goodness from a better off person to a worse off person is always an
improvement, at least if no one else is affected and the better off person is
left better off than the worse off person was originally. Thus if Rawls has
correctly diagnosed a problem with utilitarianism, Parfit’s remark seems
to be a natural response and the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle seems
to be well motivated.
I will be briefer about the defence of the other main part of the priority
view, summarized in Parfit’s (2000) claim that the priority view is not
concerned with “how each person’s level [of wellbeing] compares with the
level of other people” (p. 370), or that the priority view is “nonrelational”
(p. 372). Section 1 at least partly formalized this idea as the claim that
the restricted betterness relation is strongly separable across people. As
far as I can see, the most direct argument Parfit offers for this claim
about strong separability is by a criticism of its denial. For suppose that
the restricted betterness relation is not strongly separable across people.
Given the restricted principle of personal good, we can always find a
case in which whether one history is better than another depends upon
what the histories are like for each member of some subpopulation even
though (i) for each member of the subpopulation, the two histories are
equally good; and (ii) the subpopulation is physically isolated from the
rest of the population. This is more formal that Parfit’s discussion, but his
remarks about these divided worlds scenarios suggest that he regards it
as implausible that what things are like for the members of such a “quite
unrelated” subpopulation can make a difference to the overall evaluation
of the two histories (p. 353).
But what about the way weak ex post prioritarianism treats risk? It is
striking that one finds little discussion of risk in the philosophical literature
about the priority view. The great majority of writings which are friendly
towards the priority view follow Parfit (2000) in not mentioning risk at all.
And those which do mention it take expected utility theory to provide an
obvious and unproblematic way of extending restricted prioritarianism to
take risk into account. For example, Scheffler (1982) is one of the earliest
expressions of support for the priority view among philosophers, and
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provides a rich discussion of various ways in which one could respond to
the alleged distributive insensitivity of utilitarianism. But the extension to
risk is left to a footnote, and the addition of expected utility theory to cover
this is taken for granted. And the only defence of the priority view I am
aware of which takes a detailed look at the extension to risk is Rabinowicz
(2001, 2002). But Rabinowicz follows the rest of the literature in developing
the rationale for restricted prioritarianism independently of the extension
to risk, and then adopts expected utility theory to cover that extension
without question.
This completes the explanation of why many philosophers have been
convinced by each of the three main ideas which go into weak ex post
prioritarianism: the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle, strong separability
across people and expected utility theory. But these philosophers have also
taken a further assumption for granted. The further assumption is that if
there is a reasonably good case for each of the three ideas taken separately,
there is no difficulty in combining them: together they articulate a coherent
and important alternative to utilitarianism. There are hints in the literature
that this further assumption might not be so innocent. For example, Hurley
(1989) and Broome (1991) suggest that there are deep interconnections
between claims about distribution and claims about risk. If that is so,
inferences of the form “separately plausible therefore jointly plausible”
concerning claims about distribution and risk may be questionable. But
this suggestion seems to have been ignored by the philosophical literature
which is friendly to the priority view.
4. THE EXTENDED SEPARABILITY PRINCIPLE
This section introduces a principle which I will claim that friends of the
priority view are committed to accepting. And accepting this principle has
two effects which they might welcome. It gets rid of the features of weak
ex post prioritarianism which were said to be unsatisfactory at the end
of section 2. And it makes sense of an aspect of Parfit’s discussion of the
priority view which is not easy to understand. However, being committed
to accepting the new principle is a mixed blessing. The following section
shows that adding it to weak ex post prioritarianism entails an apparently
implausible conclusion.
The rough idea behind the new principle is this. Suppose that for some
population , L1 and L2 are lotteries over histories whose population is .
And suppose L+1 and L
+
2 are just like L1 and L2 except that they are lotteries
over histories whose population is  extended to include one extra person
who is unaffected by the choice between L+1 and L
+
2 . Then the rough idea
is that if friends of the priority view judge that L1 is better than L2, they
are committed to judging that L+1 is better than L
+
2 . Roughly speaking, an
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individual is unaffected by the choice between two lotteries if, from her
point of view, the lotteries are exactly the same.
More precisely, say that an individual j is unaffected by the choice
between two lotteries L1 and L2 just incase L1 and L2 have the form L1 = [p1,
h1; p2, h2; . . .; pm, hm] and L2 = [p1, k1; p2, k2; . . .; pm, km] and for s= 1. . .m, the
two histories hs and ks are equally good for j. Then the following formalizes
the rough idea.
The extended separability principle. Suppose that there is some population
 such that L1 and L2 are lotteries over histories whose population is .
Suppose that L+1 and L
+
2 are lotteries over histories whose population is 
together with some extra person j not in . Suppose (1) for every member i
of : i is unaffected by the choice between L1 and L+1 and i is also unaffected
by the choice between L2 and L+2 ; and (2) the extra person j is unaffected by
the choice between L+1 and L
+
2 . Then in all such cases: L1 is at least as good
as L2 if and only if L+1 is at least as good as L
+
2 .
Not everyone will accept the extended separability principle. Consider the
following example.
L1 and L2 are lotteries over histories just containing person 1, and L+1
and L+2 are lotteries over histories containing persons 1 and 2. The entries
indicate how good the lotteries are for the various people, and we assume
that x and y are not equal. L1 is exactly as good as L2, and the extended
separability principle then implies that L+1 and L
+
2 are equally good. But
egalitarians will almost certainly deny that L+1 and L
+
2 are equally good
(Broome 1991). For although they are equally good for each person, L+1 is
guaranteed to lead to equality, and L+2 is guaranteed to lead to inequality.
In fact, in my view this is really the core egalitarian idea (McCarthy ms).
Hence egalitarians will almost certainly claim that L+1 is better than L
+
2
and reject the extended separability principle.
Nevertheless, the main claim of this section is that friends of the
priority view are committed to accepting the extended separability
principle. Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) discusses a weaker version of it.
Say that an individual is completely unaffected by the choice between
two lotteries if she is unaffected by the choice, and in addition all the
histories that could result from the two lotteries are equally good for
her. And call the weak extended separability principle the result of replacing
‘unaffected’ with ‘completely unaffected’ in clause (2) in the definition
of the extended separability principle. In my terminology, Rabinowicz
says that denying the weak extended separability principle would build
an extreme sensitivity to the presence of completely unaffected people
which friends of the priority view are committed to rejecting. For the
divided worlds argument offered earlier for the claim that the restricted
betterness relation is strongly separable across people will work equally
well for the weak extended separability principle: just imagine the extra
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L1 L2 L+1 L
+
2
Heads Tails Heads Tails Heads Tails Heads Tails
1 x y y x x y y x
2 – – – – x y x y
TABLE 1. Egalitarian counterexample to extended separability.
person is physically isolated from the rest of the population, and rerun that
argument. And even if some friends of the priority view accept a different
argument for strong separability across people, it is hard to see how they
could reject the weak extended separability principle.
Although Rabinowicz’s claim that friends of the priority view are
committed to accepting the weak extended separability principle is
convincing, there is a slip in his proof that the weak extended separability
principle leads to the apparently implausible conclusion to be discussed
in the next section, and in fact it does not lead to such a conclusion. So it is
crucial to my argument that friends of the priority view are committed to
accepting the extended separability principle.
But the claim that friends of the priority view should accept the
extended separability principle emerges naturally from Parfit’s informal
discussion of nonrelationality. It is very hard to see a case against the
extended separability principle apart from the example of Table 1. But the
example of Table 1 should only appeal to egalitarians, and not to friends of
the priority view. Moreover, the extension of the divided worlds argument
for the weak extended separability principle seems to just work just as
well as an argument for the extended separability principle. And this is
what happens when we add the extended separability principle to weak
ex post prioritarianism.
THEOREM 3. Assume:
(1) There exists a restricted individual goodness measure, and any two restricted
individual goodness measures are related by a positive affine transformation.
(2) The rectangular field assumption.
(3) The restricted principle of personal good.
(4) The restricted betterness relation is an impartial continuous ordering.
(5) The restricted betterness relation is strongly separable across people (and
satisfies the hexagon condition in population-size-two cases).
(6) The restricted Pigou–Dalton principle.
(7) The betterness relation satisfies the expected utility axioms.
(8) The extended separability principle.
Then for any restricted individual goodness measure g(i, h) there exists
an increasing and strictly concave function w such that W(L)=ji∈
pjw(g(i, hj)) represents the betterness relation for any population .
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The proof is in the appendix. Taking the background conditions on trust,
this motivates the following definition.
Ex post prioritarianism. Let g(i, h) be a restricted individual goodness
measure. Then there exists an increasing and strictly concave function w
such that
W(L) =  ji∈ p jw(g(i, h j ))
represents the betterness relation for any population .
Given the background assumptions, premises (3) through (6) are
equivalent to restricted prioritarianism. The addition of premise (7) makes
them equivalent to weak ex post prioritarianism. And the further addition
of premise (8) makes them equivalent to ex post prioritarianism. There is
some redundancy in the premises of Theorem 3 since the addition of (8)
makes it possible to do without (5), but I have not eliminated it as it makes
the path from restricted prioritarianism to ex post prioritarianism easier
to follow. For what has just been said establishes
THEOREM 4. Assume the background assumptions. Suppose (1) restricted
prioritarianism is true; (2) the betterness relation satisfies the axioms of expected
utility theory; and (3) the extended separability principle is true. Then ex post
prioritarianism is true.
Here is the first benefit of accepting the extended separability principle. The
function fn which appears in the definition of weak ex post prioritarianism
has disappeared in the definition of ex post prioritarianism. So there is
no longer a problem about its interpretation. And the function wn which
appears in the definition of weak ex post prioritarianism has been replaced
by a function w which is independent of population size. In Parfit’s
terminology, this means that the urgency of improving the lots of the
worse off is independent of the number of other people around. Thus ex
post prioritarianism is not only simpler than weak ex post prioritarianism,
but is closer to the spirit of the priority view.
5. THE COINCIDENCE PRINCIPLE
This section presents the apparently implausible conclusion which ex post
prioritarianism entails. To begin, here is what seems to be a very plausible
account of when one lottery is better than another when the population
contains just one person.
The coincidence principle. For any population containing exactly one
person and any lotteries L1 and L2 over histories whose population contains
just that one person: L1 is at least as good as L2 if and only if L1 is at least as
good for the sole person as L2.
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Say that a person’s individual betterness relation holds between two lotteries
just in case the first lottery is at least as good for the individual as
the second lottery (Broome 1991). Then the coincidence principle says
that in population-size-one cases, betterness and individual betterness
coincide.
The next part of the argument adopts an account of when one lottery
is better for a person than another which has been argued for by many
people.
Bernoulli’s hypothesis. For any lotteries L1 and L2, L1 is at least as good for a
person as L2 if and only if L1 gives that person at least as great an expectation
of restricted individual goodness as L2.
Given a restricted individual goodness measure g(i, h), the expectation of
restricted individual goodness a lottery L= [p1, h1; p2, h2; . . .; pm, hm] gives
an individual i is given by the function
G(i, L) =  j p j g(i, h j )
In other words, it is just the restricted individual goodness i gets in each
history that can result from the lottery, multiplied by the probability of
that history, then all added up. The background assumptions guarantee
that Bernoulli’s hypothesis is consistent. For the measurement assumption
entails that if g(i, h) and g˜(i, h) are any two restricted individual goodness
measures, then L1 gives i at least as great an expectation of restricted
individual goodness as L2 according to g(i, h) if and only if it does so
according to g˜(i, h). Another way of looking at Bernoulli’s hypothesis is
to note that it tells us that the function G(i, L) represents i’s individual
betterness relation.
I adopted the measurement assumption with little comment in
section 1. But the measurement assumption makes a very strong claim
which is both crucial to the meaningfulness of the priority view and
far from obviously true (Broome 1991, McCarthy 2006, 2007). However,
Bernoulli’s hypothesis turns out to entail the measurement assumption,
and my own view is that it is the case for Bernoulli’s hypothesis which
makes the case for the measurement assumption. Bernoulli’s hypothesis
is not at all obvious. Nevertheless, it has been argued for (Harsanyi 1975,
1977; Broome 1991; Hammond 1991; Jensen 1995; Risse 2002; McCarthy
2006, 2007). And it is accepted by Rabinowicz (2001, 2002) in his discussion
of ex post prioritarianism. Here I am simply going to take it for granted.
But it creates some trouble for ex post prioritarianism, as the following
theorem indicates.
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THEOREM 5. Assume the background assumptions. Then Bernoulli’s
hypothesis and ex post prioritarianism imply that the coincidence principle is
false.
PROOF. Assume a population just containing person 1. Let g(i, h) be a
restricted individual goodness measure. By the background assumptions
there exist histories h0, h1 and h2 such that h0 is better for person 1 than
h1, and h1 is better for person 1 than h2. Simple algebra shows that there
exists p such that 0 < p< 1 such that g(1, h1) = pg(1, h0) + (1 − p)g(1, h2). By
Bernoulli’s hypothesis the degenerate lottery L1 = [1, h1] is exactly as good
for person 1 as the lottery L2 = [p, h0; (1 − p), h2]. By ex post prioritarianism,
there exists some increasing and strictly concave function w such that L1
is better than L2 iff w(g(1, h1)) > pw(g(1, h0)) + (1 − p)w(g(1, h2)). But this
inequality holds by a well known fact about concave functions (Hardy et al.
1934). Hence L1 is better than L2, contrary to the coincidence principle.
Note that the proof does not require the background assumptions; it
only requires the very weak assumption that there exist the three histories
mentioned. So given Bernoulli’s hypothesis, ex post prioritarians are forced
to reject the coincidence principle. In fact, it is easy to modify the proof
(by making p a tiny bit smaller) to show that given the existence of the
three histories mentioned, the betterness relation and the better-for-the-
sole-individual relation sometimes have to say strictly opposite things:
one lottery can be better than another, even though it is worse for the sole
individual.
Here is the second benefit of accepting the extended separability
principle. As noted in section 1, both Parfit (2000) and Rabinowicz
(2001, 2002) suggest that the priority view has distinctive conclusions in
population-size-one cases. But this suggestion is far from straightforward.
Suppose, for example, that we characterize the priority view via the slogan
that benefiting the worse off matters more. There is an immediate difficulty
when we ask: what exactly does this amount to in one-person cases? We
can make at least partial sense of the slogan in two-or-more person cases
if we take the slogan to entail (even if is not equivalent to) the restricted
Pigou–Dalton principle. But by itself, the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle
has no implications in one-person cases.
In fact, neither Parfit nor Rabinowicz succeed in articulating a version
of the priority view which says something distinctive in one-person cases
in the following sense: neither articulates a version of the priority view
which is inconsistent with what utilitarianism says about one-person cases.
Parfit does not discuss risk at all, and any version of the priority view
accepts what I will call restricted coincidence principle: in population-size-
one cases, one history is at least as good as another if and only if it is at least
as good for the sole individual. This is just the restriction of the restricted
principle of personal good to populations of size one. But utilitarianism
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also accepts the restricted coincidence principle, so it is hard to know what
Parfit has in mind for one-person cases.
Rabinowicz’s position is more subtle. He makes the very important
point that one is going to have to discuss risk to make sense of a
disagreement between utilitarianism and the priority view in one-person
cases. The version of prioritarianism he ends up with is, in my terminology,
the conjunction of weak ex post prioritarianism and the weak extended
separability principle. He claims that this version of prioritarianism is
inconsistent with the coincidence principle. But it isn’t. To see why not,
suppose person 1 is the sole member of the population, and that the
image of the restricted individual goodness measure g(1, h) on histories
containing person 1 is the positive reals. For all n, take the functions fn and
wn in the definition of weak ex post prioritarianism to be the exponential
and logarithmic functions respectively. Given Bernoulli’s hypothesis, it is
easy to show that this form of weak ex post prioritarianism is consistent
with (in fact, entails) both the weak extended separability principle and the
coincidence principle. But utilitarianism accepts the coincidence principle.
So the version of the priority view Rabinowicz articulates is not strong
enough to force a disagreement with utilitarianism in one-person cases.
The second benefit of accepting the extended separability principle is
therefore this. Given Parfit’s remarks about nonrelationality, it seems that
friends of the priority view are committed to the extended separability
principle anyway. But Theorem 5 shows adding it to weak ex post
prioritarianism results in a version of the priority view which does
say something distinctive about one-person cases. So the addition of
the extended separability principle and the consequent rejection of the
coincidence principle has the benefit of interpreting the priority view in a
way which makes sense of Parfit’s and Rabinowicz’s suggestions.
However, the coincidence principle seems very plausible. So plausible,
in fact, that it is tempting to regard the forced rejection of the coincidence
principle as a reductio of ex post prioritarianism.
6. ASSESSING EX POST PRIORITARIANISM
Ex post prioritarians have an obvious response. They can claim that the
premises of ex post prioritarianism are plausible enough to make a good
case for rejecting the coincidence principle. So the most important question
now seems to be: what can we say about the relative plausibility of the
premises of ex post prioritarianism and the coincidence principle?
But first I need to bypass a complication pointed out by Broome (2004).
Whether one life is a better life than another life surely depends only on
what each life is like from a perspective which is somehow internal to
the life in question. But whether it is better that one life exists rather than
another life exists may depend on features of the world that are external
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to this perspective, such as the time of existence. To illustrate, those who
believe in temporal discounting will have to say that in population size-
one-cases, it is worse for an individual’s existence to be delayed when
the delay will make no difference to the individual’s life from the internal
perspective and will therefore not be worse for the individual. Hence an
established position is inconsistent with the coincidence principle.
However this alleged counterexample to the coincidence principle
works by being inconsistent with the restricted coincidence principle.
So as things stand, the alleged counterexample is of no help to ex post
prioritarians for it is inconsistent with a principle they themselves accept.
Ex post prioritarians can respond in one of two ways. They can either reject
temporal discounting, or they can modify their own position to allow for
it. The modification will claim that the restricted coincidence principle
only applies to lives which take place over the same interval of time etc.
But the rejection of the coincidence principle had nothing to do with time,
and this modified version of ex post prioritarianism will have to reject a
similarly modified version of the coincidence principle. Hence appealing to
temporal discounting or any similar view about time is a useless diversion
in trying to defend ex post prioritarianism against the accusation that it is
forced to reject an apparently very plausible principle. So I will henceforth
ignore it.
Returning now to the main argument, let T be the conjunction of
Bernoulli’s hypothesis and all of the premises in Theorem 3 apart from
the restricted Pigou–Dalton condition. T is therefore composed of the
background assumptions we are taking on trust, Bernoulli’s hypothesis,
and claims which ex post prioritarianism entails. And we already have
(1) Given T: ex post prioritarianism ⇔ the restricted Pigou–Dalton
principle.
As already discussed, there is little prospect for defending ex post
prioritarianism by rejectingT. Therefore, we will have an argument against
ex post prioritarianism if we can show that given T, the restricted Pigou–
Dalton principle is less plausible than its negation.
T is a powerful theory. A routine adjustment to the proofs of
Theorems 1 and 3 yields
(2) T ⇒ there exists an increasing function k such that for any population
, the betterness relation for  is represented by K(L) =ji∈pjk(g(i,
hj)).
Given the background assumptions and Bernoulli’s hypothesis, the
following definition of utilitarianism is uncontroversial.
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Utilitarianism. Let g(i, h) be a restricted individual goodness measure. Then
U(L) =  ji∈ p j g(i, h j )
represents the betterness relation for any population .
Note that T is also composed of the background assumptions we are taking
on trust, Bernoulli’s hypothesis, and claims which utilitarianism entails.
We can therefore treat T as a background theory which is common ground
to both utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism. And we have
(3) Given T: utilitarianism ⇔ the coincidence principle.
PROOF. Left to right is immediate by Bernoulli’s hypothesis. For right
to left, let  be a population of size 1. Then (2), the coincidence principle,
and Bernoulli’s hypothesis force the function k in (2) to be linear, hence the
result.
Therefore, we will have an argument against ex post prioritarianism
if we can show that given T, the coincidence principle is more plausible
than the restricted Pigou–Dalton condition. This is an interesting issue to
address because we have seen that the rationales for the priority view
are typically based on a contrast with utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has
suffered greatly in moral philosophy from the assumption that the best
argument for it is the impartial spectator argument, an argument which
faces serious difficulties. But (3) shows that given a background theory on
which both utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism can agree, utilitarians
only need to argue for the apparently plausible coincidence principle.
Let us begin with the possible rationales for the restricted Pigou–
Dalton condition given T. I can think of three. The restricted Pigou–
Dalton condition could be said to be (i) motivated by the alleged
distributive insensitivity of utilitarianism; (ii) motivated by an appeal to
the separateness of persons; or (iii) just self-evidently plausible. Of course,
these rationales have to work against the background of T.
Distributive insensitivity. Philosophers often say that utilitarianism is
distributively insensitive, but this can be interpreted in different ways.
Every complaint I am aware of falls into one of two classes. The first
class is exemplified by the complaint that utilitarianism implies that a
small benefit to each member of a sufficiently large group of people
outweighs one person bearing a large burden. But every theory which
accepts T has this implication because of the additive form of the function
in (2). More generally, complaints in the first class are distinguished by
applying to all theories which accept T, so are useless for motivating
ex post prioritarianism as an alternative to utilitarianism.
The second class is exemplified by the complaint that utilitarianism
cares only about the sum of individual goodness, and not about how that
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sum is distributed. But (2) implies that every theory which accepts T cares
only about the sum of some function of individual goodness, and not about
how that sum is distributed. In the case of utilitarianism, the function is
the identity function; in the case of ex post prioritarianism, the function is
a strictly concave function. So for the complaint to apply to utilitarianism
and not to ex post prioritarianism, it has to say: mistaken to care only
about the sum of individual goodness; not mistaken to care only about the
sum of a concave transformation of individual goodness. But given T, this
is just to assert the correctness of the restricted Pigou–Dalton condition.
More generally, complaints in the second class are distinguished by taking
the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle for granted. They therefore do not
motivate the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle.
Separateness of persons. Section 3 sketched a motivation for the restricted
Pigou–Dalton principle which rested upon Rawls’s separateness of
persons criticism of the impartial spectator argument for utilitarianism.
But there are now two serious objections to this. The first is that given T,
the derivation of utilitarianism uses nothing like the impartial spectator
argument. It simply adds the coincidence principle, and it is hard to believe
that to assert the coincidence principle is to ignore the separateness of
persons. In response, a friend of ex post prioritarianism might claim that
there is a separateness of persons objection to the coincidence principle
givenT, for givenT the addition of the coincidence principle yields a theory,
namely utilitarianism, that is said to treat interpersonal and intrapersonal
aggregation in the same way. And the objection continues: to treat these in
the same way is to ignore the separateness of persons.
But what exactly does it mean to say that utilitarianism treats
interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation in the same way? The
objection is plainly attempting to point to some aspect of the way
utilitarianism aggregates which is independent of whether the aggregation
involves just one person or whether it involves two or more people. LetLbe
some lottery, and (i1, h j1 ), . . ., (ik, h jk ) be an arbitrary list of some of the lives
that could result from L. We can think of these lives as locations of goodness
which somehow need to be factored into the evaluation of the overall
goodness of L. According to utilitarianism, the contribution of these lives
to the overall goodness of L is always the same independently of whether
i1 . . . ik are all the same individuals, all different, or some mixture thereof.
This is immediate from the definition of utilitarianism. And as far as I can
see, this is the only feature of utilitarianism which really invites the claim
that utilitarianism treats interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation in the
same way. But it is immediate from the definition of ex post prioritarianism
that ex post prioritarianism shares this feature with utilitarianism. In fact,
(2) entails that any consistent theory containing T already has this feature.
So given T, any motivation for the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle which
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is based on the assertion that interpersonal and intrapersonal aggregation
should be treated differently is self-defeating.
Self evidence. I suspect that many philosophers simply find the plausibility
of the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle self-evident. But the issue here
is whether it is plausible given T, and I strongly suspect that such
philosophers would find the coincidence principle even more self-
evidently plausible. But we have seen that given T, the restricted Pigou–
Dalton principle and the coincidence principle are jointly inconsistent. The
proof of that involves some fairly complicated mathematics, so it is hard to
take seriously the view that the plausibility of the restricted Pigou–Dalton
principle given T is somehow self-evident.
My own view is stronger. Someone who finds the restricted Pigou–
Dalton principle self-evidently plausible is committed to individual
goodness having a lot of quantitative structure. Along with many other
people, I accept this claim. But such a person is also committed to a
view I call distributive intuitionism: the plausibility of distributive claims
about simple cases which exploit the quantitative structure of individual
goodness is transparent to intuition. I reject distributive intuitionism, so I
do not believe that there are any grounds for claiming that the restricted
Pigou–Dalton principle is self-evidently plausible. It would take a detailed
discussion of the general theory of measurement to explain why I reject
distributive intuitionism, and I cannot do that here. But it turns out that the
best defence of utilitarianism does not rely upon any distributive claims
which exploit the quantitative structure of individual goodness, and is
consistent with the rejection of distributive intuitionism.
However, it is not easy to explain why that is true. The defence of
utilitarianism which proceeds by arguing for T and then arguing for the
coincidence principle is not very efficient. A more efficient defence is
provided by a direct appeal to the famous aggregation theorem of Harsanyi
(1955) and the status of Bernoulli’s hypothesis as a claim about meaning,
not distribution. And this defense is the best one to focus on to argue that
the case for utilitarianism does not rely on distributive intuitionism. But I
lack the space to discuss this here. For more details, see Broome (1991) and
McCarthy (2006). However, I can at least give a hint about what is going on.
Given T, we need the restricted Pigou–Dalton condition to get to ex post
prioritarianism. The restricted Pigou–Dalton principle plainly exploits the
quantitative structure of individual goodness. But to get to utilitarianism,
we only need the coincidence principle. But there is a good case for this
principle even if there is no quantitative structure to individual goodness,
for this principle only involves the comparatives ‘at least as good for a
person as’ and ‘at least as good as’. So unlike the imagined defence of the
restricted Pigou–Dalton principle, the case for the coincidence principle
does not rely upon distributive intuitionism.
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Since I cannot argue against distributive intuitionism here, I cannot
claim to have provided a decisive objection to the claim that the restricted
Pigou–Dalton principle is self-evident. But I can claim that the imagined
defence of ex post prioritarianism is bearing a burden not borne by the best
defence of utilitarianism. For as far as I can see, no one has tried to make the
case for distributive intuitionism. Such a case would surely have to take a
close look at the meaning of quantitative talk about individual goodness,
but this topic has been rather neglected. Until someone tries to make this
case, there is a large gap in the defence of ex post prioritarianism which
appeals to the self-evidence of the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle.
I can now draw a conclusion. Given T, appeals to neither the alleged
distributive insensitivity of utilitarianism nor the separateness of persons
provide any motivation for the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle. And
given T, the plausibility of the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle is not
self-evident. Thus given T, the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle is not well
motivated. And given that adding the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle
to T results in the rejection of the apparently very plausible coincidence
principle, I conclude that ex post prioritarianism is not a viable alternative
to utilitarianism.
7. FROM EX POST PRIORITARIANISM TO UTILITARIANISM
But actually, I doubt that ex post prioritarianism is any kind of alternative
to utilitarianism at all. I continue to take Bernoulli’s hypothesis on
trust.
Both utilitarianism and ex post prioritarianism imply that there
exists a function v which represents the better life relation such that
for any population , the betterness relation for  is represented by
V(L) =ji∈ p jv(i, h j ). Suppose that there is such a function.
Utilitarianism will turn out to be correct if and only if v is a
restricted individual goodness measure. Ex post prioritarianism will
turn out to be correct if and only if v is an increasing and strictly
concave transformation of a restricted individual goodness measure.
Setting aside other possibilities (e.g. that v is a convex transformation of
a restricted individual goodness measure), there are three possibilities:
(i) utilitarianism is correct; (ii) ex post prioritarianism is correct; and
(iii) both are determinately neither correct nor incorrect, or it is
indeterminate which is correct, or somesuch. What kind of fact would
settle which of these obtains?
If v is a restricted individual goodness measure, we have:
(1) For any restricted individual goodness measure g(i, h) and any
population , the betterness relation for  is represented by V(L) =
 ji∈ p j g(i, h j ).
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If v is an increasing and strictly concave transformation of a restricted
individual goodness measure, we have
(2) For any restricted individual goodness measure g(i, h) there exists
an increasing and strictly concave function w such that for any
population , the betterness relation for  is represented by V(L) =
 ji∈ p jw(g(i, hj ).
It seems clear that (1) gives us a simpler characterization of the betterness
relation than (2). Moreover, those who accept (2) have to live with the
added complication that in population size one cases, betterness and
betterness for the sole individual do not coincide. And I suggest that
this greater simplicity decides the case in favour of utilitarianism, not on
any ethical grounds, but on grounds of meaning. The ex post prioritarian
interpretation takes restricted individual goodness measures to provide us
with an important way of characterizing ethics, but does it in an apparently
gratuitously complex way for it is everywhere uniformly discounted. Until
ex post prioritarians give us an explanation of the theoretical point of
this extra complexity, I do not believe they have managed to articulate a
genuine alternative to utilitarianism. However, it would take a separate
article to give these questions about meaning a proper treatment, so for
now I leave it as an invitation for ex post prioritarians to respond. For
related arguments, see Harsanyi (1977), and the arguments for Bernoulli’s
hypothesis in Broome (1991, 2004) and McCarthy (2006, 2007), although
note that this section takes Bernoulli’s hypothesis for granted.
8. THE PRIORITY VIEW RECONSIDERED
I have been taking some assumptions on trust, either as relatively
uncontroversial or as harmless idealizing assumptions. The focus has
been on the effect of adding three further assumptions: the restricted
Pigou–Dalton condition, the extended separability principle (which
actually entails the separability assumptions which go into restricted
prioritarianism), and the claim that the betterness relation satisfies the
expected utility axioms. I have claimed that the resulting theory, ex post
prioritarianism, is indefensible. But I have not tried to locate the fault in
any one of the three further assumptions. In fact, it is only the addition
of all three which leads to serious trouble. The addition of any two is
consistent with a defensible theory.
Utilitarianism is consistent with (in fact, entails) the extended
separability principle and the claim that the betterness relation satisfies
the expected utility axioms, but it rejects the restricted Pigou–Dalton
condition. This is immediate from the definition of utilitarianism given
earlier. As already noted, the best defence of utilitarianism is based on the
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aggregation theorem of Harsanyi (1955), essentially involves claims about
risk, and does not rely on distributive intuitionism.
Egalitarianism is consistent with (though I believe it does not entail
either of) the restricted Pigou–Dalton condition and the claim that the
betterness relation satisfies the expected utility axioms, but it rejects the
extended separability principle. I believe that there is a reasonable defence
of the form of egalitarianism which accepts the restricted Pigou–Dalton
condition and the claim that the betterness relation satisfies the expected
utility axioms. This defence likewise essentially involves claims about risk,
and does not rely on distributive intuitionism (McCarthy ms).
A third defensible view is consistent with (in fact, entails) the restricted
Pigou–Dalton condition and the extended separability principle, but rejects
the claim that the betterness relation satisfies the expected utility axioms.
I discuss this view at length in McCarthy (2006), so here I will give a brief
summary. The key idea is due to Diamond (1967), who suggested that when
two contestants for a good are perfectly symmetrically placed, it is better
to bring about a fair lottery than to give the good directly to one of the two
people. Call this the lottery claim. But pace Broome (1991), the lottery claim
leads to the rejection of the claim that the betterness relation satisfies the
central expected utility axiom, the so-called strong independence axiom or
sure thing principle. The lottery claim is therefore inconsistent with ex post
prioritarianism. And with the extended separability principle, the lottery
claim leads to
Ex ante prioritarianism For any restricted individual goodness measure g(i,
h) there exists an increasing and strictly concave function w such that
P(L) =  ji∈w(p j g(i, h j ))
represents the betterness relation for any population .
Notice that the probability pj lies inside the scope of the function
w. The definition of ex post prioritarianism is the same, except that
there the probability pj lies outside the scope of w. This difference
in position reflects a large ethical difference, manifested in Diamond’s
example. Ex ante prioritarianism implies that it is better to toss the
fair coin, but ex post prioritarianism is indifferent. These forms of
prioritarianism are equivalent when restricted to histories, entailing
restricted prioritarianism and hence the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle.
But this defence of the restricted Pigou–Dalton principle is not available
to ex post prioritarianism, for it essentially involves the lottery claim.
This defence of ex ante prioritarianism does not rely on distributive
intuitionism, for the plausibility of the lottery claim is independent of
whether there is any quantitative structure to individual goodness, and it
essentially involves claims about risk.
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However, although ex ante prioritarianism is a defensible view
and was popular with economists decades before philosophers became
interested in the priority view, this should be of little consolation to those
who have been tempted by the ideas which go into ex post prioritarianism.
The rationales that have been offered for ex post prioritarianism are very
different from the rationale for ex ante prioritarianism. The appeal of
ex post prioritarianism is illusory, and the closest defensible position is
utilitarianism.
If my brief remarks about utilitarianism, egalitarianism and ex ante
prioritarianism are correct, it follows that claims about risk lie at the
heart of a wide range of reasonably plausible theories about distribution.
This article has been a case study in the converse. Ignoring the complex
logical relations between claims about risk and claims about distribution
can lead to extremely implausible theories even when the premises of
those theories are by themselves reasonably plausible. I earlier noted
two tendencies in the literature about the priority view: making claims
about distribution while postponing thinking about risk, and assuming
that separately plausible claims about risk and distribution are jointly
plausible. I suggest that while these tendencies look quite innocent, they
turn out to contain serious mistakes.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Let = {1, . . .,n} be a population of size n≥ 2, for
the case n= 1 is immediate from (3). Let g(i, h) be a restricted individual
goodness measure, and write it as gi(h). Let H be the set of histories
containing . For any i∈, (2) implies that I= gi(H) is an interval of real
numbers of positive length. By (2) through (5) there exists a continuous
ordering 	 of I n which is strongly separable (and satisfies the hexagon
condition if n= 2) such that: (i) for all h1, h2 ∈H: h1 is at least as good as h2
if and only if [g1 (h1), . . ., gn (h1)]	 [g1 (h2), . . .,gn (h2)]. By the central theorem
of additive representation (Wakker, 1989) there exist continuous functions
wi: I→R, i= 1 . . . n such that: (ii) for all x, y∈ ln: x	 y iff iwi(xi) ≥iwi(yi).
By (4) the wi’s are all identical; write wn =w1 = · · ·=wn. By (3) wn is
increasing. By (6) wn is strictly concave. By (i) and (ii) i∈wn(gi(h))
represents the restricted betterness relation for . Let g˜i (h) be some other
individual goodness relation. It is a positive affine transformation of g˜i (h),
hence g˜i (h) = agi (h) + b. But then i∈w˜n(g˜i (h)) represents the restricted
betterness relation for  where w˜n(x) = wn( x−ba ). Since wn is increasing
and strictly concave, so is w˜n. If 1 is some other population of size n, (4)
entails that i∈,wn(gi (h)) represents the restricted betterness relation for
1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let g(i, h) and I be as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let
k = {1, . . ., k} be a population of size k≥ 1, and let k+1 = {1, . . ., k+ 1}
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be the population obtained by adding person k+ 1 to k. If H is some
nonempty set of histories, write (H) for the set of lotteries with finite
support over H.
Step 1:By Theorem 1, (1) through (6) entail that for anyn≥ 1 there exists
an increasing and strictly concave function wn such that i∈wn(gi(h))
represents the restricted betterness relation for any population  of
size n. Case (a): suppose k≥ 2. Let 	k and 	k+1 be orderings on Ik
and Ik+1 respectively such that (i) for all h1, h2 ∈ Hk : h1 is at least as
good as h2 if and only if [g1(h1),. . ., gk(h1)] 	k [g1(h2),. . .,gk(h2)]; and
(ii) for all h1, h2 ∈ Hk+1 : h1 is at least as good as h2 if and only if
[g1(h1), . . ., gk+1 (h1)] 	k+1 [g1(h2), . . ., gk+1 (h2)]. Then 	k and 	k+1 are
represented by
∑k
i=1 wk(xi ) and
∑k+1
i=1 wk+1(xi ). Let c ∈ I and let 	ck+1
be a relation on Ik defined by: for all [x1, . . . xk], [y1, . . ., yk] ∈ Ik: [x1, . . . xk]
	ck+1 [y1, . . ., yk iff [x1, . . . xk, c] 	k+1 [y1, . . . , yk, c]. By (8), 	ck+1=	k . Hence∑k
i=1 wk(xi ) and
∑k
i=1 wk+1(xi ) represent the same relation on I
k. By the
uniqueness of additive representations (see e.g. Wakker 1989) there exist
a> 0 and b such that such that wk(x) = awk+1(x) + b for all x∈ I. Hence for
all k≥ 2, wk+1 can be obtained from wk by a positive affine transformation.
Let w be a positive affine transformation of w2 such that w(k) = 0 for some
k∈ I. We have shown that i∈w(gi(h)) represents the restricted betterness
relation for any population  of size n≥ 2. Case (b): (3) entails that
i∈w(gi(h)) represents the restricted betterness relation for any population
II of size one.
Step 2: By (6) and Theorem 2, for any n≥ 1 there exists an increasing
function fn such that Wn(L) represents the betterness relation for any
population  of size n where Wn(L) =jpjfn(i∈w(gi(hj))) for any lottery
L= [p1, h1: . . . . ; pm, hm] ∈(H).
Step 3: Let J=w(I), and note that since I is an interval of positive
length and w is continuous, J is also an interval of positive length,
and note also by definition of w that 0 ∈ J. Now let 	k be an ordering
on (Jk) such that for any L1, L2 ∈(Hk): L1 is at least as good
as L2 if and only if ρk(L1) 	k ρk(L2) where ρk([p1, h1; . . .; pm, hm]) =
[p1, [w(g1(h1)), . . . , w(gk(h1))]; . . . ; pm, [w(g1(hm)), . . . , w(gk(hm))]]. Define
	k+1 similarly, and note that for any [p1, x1; . . . ; pm, xm], [q1, y1; . . . ;
qm′ , ym′ ] ∈( j k+1): [p1, x1; . . . ; pm, xm] 	k+1 [q1, y1; . . . ; qm′ , ym′ ] iff mj=1 p j
fk+1(k+1i=1 xji ) ≥ m
′
j=1q j fk+1(
k+1
i=1 yji ). Let M
+
1 , M
+
2 ∈ (J k+1) be such that
M+1 = [ 12 , [y, 0, . . . , 0, x]; 12 , [x, 0, . . . , 0, y]], M+2 = [ 12 , [x, 0, . . . , 0, x]; 12 , [y,
0, . . . , 0, y]] for some x, y ∈ J . Let M1 M2 ∈(Jk) be such that M1 = [ 12 ,
[y, 0, . . . , 0]; 12 , [x, 0, . . . , 0]], M2 = [ 12 , [x, 0, . . . , 0]; 12 , [y, 0, . . . , 0]]. There
exist L1, L2 ∈(Hk ), L+1 , L+2 ∈ (Hk+1 ) such that ρk(L1) = M1, ρk(L2) =
M2, ρk+1(L+1 ) = M+1 , ρk+1(L+2 ) = M+2 . By (7), L1 is at least as good as L2 if
and only if L+1 is at least as good as L
+
2 . But L1 and L2 are equally good
by (3) and (7). Hence L+1 and L
+
2 are equally good. So
1
2 fk+1(y + x) + 12
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fk+1(x + y) = 12 fk+1(x + x) + 12 fk+1(y + y). So we have shown that for
all x, y ∈ J , 2 fk+1(x + y) = fk+1(2x) + fk+1(2y). Letting u= 2x, v= 2y
transforms this to Jensen’s equation on an interval. Since fk+1 is increasing
it is linear by Acze´l (1966). Hence for any population  of size ≥2, the
betterness relation for  is represented by W(L) = ji∈ p jw(gi (h j )). Now
let M+1 , M
+
2 ∈ (J 2) be such that M+1 = [p1, [x1, 0]; . . . ; pm, [xm, 0]]. M+2 =
[q1, [y1, 0]; . . . ; qm′ , [ym′ , 0]] for some x1, . . ., xm, y1 . . . ym′ ∈ J. Let M1,
M2 ∈(J) be such that M1 = [p1, x1; . . . ; pm, xm], M2 = [q1, y1; . . . ; qm′ , ym′ ].
By (7),M1 is at least as good asM2 if and only if M+1 is at least as good as M
+
2 .
Hence mj=1 p j f1(xj ) ≥ m
′
j=1q j f1(yj ) if and only if 
m
j=1 p j xj ≥ m
′
j=1q j yj .
Hence f1 is linear. So for any population of  of size 1, the betterness
relation for  is represented by W(L) =  ji∈ p jw(gi (h j )).
Step 4: Let g˜i (h) be some other individual goodness relation. By (1), with
the same notation and argument as the last part of the proof of Theorem 1,
for any population of , the betterness relation for  is represented by
W(L) =  ji∈ p j w˜(g˜i (h j )). This completes the proof.
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